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© 2011 Slate & Shell

Understanding Pro Games

Volume 1

Yuan Zhou

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“Understanding Pro Games, volume 1” contains four games analyzed and explained by Yuan Zhou. Zhou is especially adept at clarifying what is happening in pro games so that even relative beginners can benefit from studying them.

This e-book is a selection of commentaries on professional games from two print books by Yuan Zhou. There are two of the fourteen games in Master Play: The Styles of Seven Top Pros and two of the fourteen in Understanding Pro Games, both published by Slate & Shell (www.slateandshell.com).

Contents

Understanding Pro Games: Volume 1

About the Author

Game 1: Kong Jie – Chen Yaoye

The chapters in gray are included only in the full book.

Game 2: Wu Zhaoyi – Nie Weiping

Game 3: Kitani Minoru – Sakata Eio

Game 4: Sakata Eio – Takagawa Kaku

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About SmartGo Books

About the Author

Yuan Zhou is one of the strongest go players in the AGA and a popular teacher as well as the author of many go books. He has won many titles since coming to the US in 1989 from his native China, where he was in training to become a professional player. He has represented the US in several international tournaments, most recently the 4th Korea Prime Minister Cup in 2009 in which he placed fifth. Zhou is also a popular teacher and lecturer. You can contact him through his web site at www.zhouyuan.com.

Game 1

White: Kong Jie
Black: Chen Yaoye
Komi: 7½ points
Date: December 2009
Event: Special Invitational Tournament
Round: Final

Kong Jie and Chen Yaoye are currently among the top players in China. Kong is ranked number one at the moment (2010), and in the Korean ranking of all pros, he is number one in the world. This reflects his recent wins of three international tournaments: the LG Cup in February 2009 (defeating Lee Changho of Korea in the finals 2–0), the Samsung Cup in December 2009 (again defeating Lee Changho in the finals 2–0), and the Fujitsu Cup in July 2010 (defeating Korea’s number one player Lee Sedol in the final).

Chen Yaoye set the record for the youngest player in history to make 9 dan. This was as a result of his being the runner-up in two international tournaments, the LG Cup (losing in the final to Gu Li in 2006 when Chen was fourteen) and the Asian TV Cup the next year (losing to Lee Sedol). He won the Chinese Tianyuan tournament in 2009 and 2010, defeating Gu Li (currently number two in China) both times. He also won the Chinese CCTV Cup in 2010.

Kong Jie’s style is balanced and solid, similar to Lee Changho’s except that he tends to be more aggressive than Lee. Chen Yaoye is considered a new version of Cho Chikun in terms of his style—very territorial. The territorial player must be patient and have a very accurate grasp of what is happening in the game. This game was played in a private-company-sponsored invitational tournament in December 2009. At the time Kong was ranked number one in China and Chen was number two. This was the final of the match. Komi was seven and a half points. Chen was Black and Kong White.

Moves 1–4

This is a very common opening pattern. The two star point pattern is a very popular opening for White. The 4–4 point stones are not biased in either direction, which gives White flexibility and also avoids giving the opponent an obvious target, such as the weak side of a 3–4 stone. Common choices for Black’s next move are the Chinese opening at A or the Kobayashi opening at B, aiming for C. Black can also approach at D in the upper left. However, Chen has something else in mind.

Move 5

Chen approached at Black 5. Until fairly recently this was considered a bad move—it is in the wrong direction. Black should either make a moyo on the right side or attack one of White’s corners from the direction of one of Black’s corner stones so that Black develops his own potential while attacking. Black 5 seems to be a single-purpose move, only trying to ruin White’s potential. However, nowadays 5 is seen as a legitimate way to play for territorial players. The top and bottom are seen as having equal potential for both players. So Black aims to ruin White’s left side area while the right side is still fully available to Black. This is a way of maintaining the value of having first move. In the past White would pincer around A, which is easy to understand—White hopes Black will take the corner and let White get the left side. Diagram 1 shows a standard result, which is very appealing to Black as a territorial player—the corner is solid territory. To the territorial player, White’s left side is too open in Diagram 1 to be seen as a good result.

Diagram 1

Move 6

Kong makes a calm and solid response, although White 6 would also not have been seen as a good move in the past: the traditional idea is that White is stronger on the left side so he should attack with a pincer. White 6 aims to slow down the pace of the game and still get the corner.

Move 7

Making a solid position is correct for Black. Playing 7 at A, aiming to develop a large position, is asking for trouble since White is stronger on this side. White could easily invade at B, for example, if Black 7 is at A. Black A would only be appropriate if there is a black stone in the lower left corner. A completely settled group inside White’s area is the best Black can do.

Moves 8–9

Move 10

White 10 is the correct direction for White. In the first place, the 3–4 stone takes priority over a 4–4 stone because with the 3–4 stone, the corner can be closed with only one more move. Also, with in place, the value of development at the top has been significantly reduced for both sides. Now the right side is the biggest open area. 10 is low because with the developments in the upper left corner, this will not become a moyo game. Playing on the fourth line looks toward center development.

Move 11

Black responds with a three-space pincer at 11. Playing at A is more severe although it may lead to the fight in Diagram 2. It is not clear that Black will gain from this so he avoids it. The game play has a better relationship with the black stone in the upper right corner. If White runs out at the bottom, a counter-attack on the pincer stone will be much more difficult for White. Until fairly recently the two-space high pincer at B was seen as best because it is a good balance between the one-space and the three-space pincers. Nowadays, many players want things to be more clear and direct, so they avoid the two-space pincer and either aim for territory or for a fight. In this game Black is playing consistently for territory.

Diagram 2

Move 12

A common response to a pincer by White is to make a two-space jump out. Then Black also makes a two-space jump on the bottom edge, which creates territory. Next, White must seek compensation by attacking the pincer from the other side. In this game that’s not attractive to White because Black’s position toward the top is tighter. This is why White chooses a joseki that focuses more on the corner.

Moves 13–14

Black 13 is a common continuation. If is at A, after White 14, Black could push at B with 15 and cut, but is too far away to help with that. Naturally, Black is taking territory.

Move 15

After Black 15, now that White has built some thickness, White would normally attack the pincer (), but that is not attractive to White in this case as we noted. Pay attention to White’s next move.

Moves 16–18

White makes the forcing exchange of White 16-Black 17 and then goes for the corner with 18. See Diagram 3.

Diagram 3

White 16 () is actually a loss for White, helping Black solidify his group, but it is a ladder breaker. If after White 18 () in the game, Black goes into the corner with Black 1, White will push and cut with 2 and 4. The ladder following Black 7 is the issue. With in place, this ladder is good for White so Black cannot play this way. aims to keep the corner open to White.

Move 19

Since Black cannot take the corner he changes direction with 19. Black 19 also fixes the ladder problem for Black.

Move 20

White would like to push at A with White 20 to protect the corner, but if White A, Black will push at 20, creating a complicated situation without clear result. White chooses to play solidly with 20.

Diagram 4

Black would like to continue with 21 at Black 1 in Diagram 4 in order to deny the corner to White. However, White will push and cut with 2 and 4. The result is that the stones are cut off. Black is not ready for this. The stones are too vulnerable with the white stone in the lower left corner. However, Black 1 is very big—it takes the corner and removes White’s base. Black is thinking about it.

Move 21

Black 21 aims to prepare for the sequence in Diagram 4.

Move 22

White protects the corner with 22 because of the strong black group on the upper left side. Black does not start Diagram 4 because it is not clear it will be a gain for Black and territorial players avoid plays that have unclear results. See Diagram 5.

Diagram 5

Black is still not ready for Diagram 4 after Black 21 in the game, because White has an alternative for White 4 in that sequence. White can play as in Diagram 5. This way White could press Black down on the bottom and gain useful center influence.

Move 23

Moves 24–25

White decides to eliminate the need to worry about possible bad aji in the lower right corner. First he pushes at 24 and Black blocks with 25 of course.

Move 26

White 26 then acknowledges that the bottom side is Black’s territory.

Move 27

Black enlarges his area with 27 and prevents a hane at the head of his two stones.

Move 28

White prevents the hane at 28 that Black would play next in order to destroy White’s base. Note that 28 at A would also be gote at this point (White would connect after Black does) and White would lose the option of cutting later at B.

Move 29

Black 29 prevents an invasion which would be White’s next ploy. The game is even at this point—both players have about thirty points (including White’s komi). White’s approaching at A is big, but it is not clear what would result. If Black jumps to B, however, it is clear that becomes very badly placed.

Move 30

White 30 makes a good move. Making the most of your stones already on the board is key. 30 threatens playing at A, a big move. If Black defends at B, White will approach at C.

End of sample chapter. In the book, this game is commented to the end.