© 2013 by Yuan Zhou

Deep Thought: Extremely Thorough Commentaries on Pro Games, Volume Two

Yuan Zhou

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This book contains three famous pro games that are commented on in an unusually thorough way. Every move is explained and critiqued, except for a very few cases in very normal short sequences. Hence, almost all game diagrams show only one new move. The aim is not only to give readers a full understanding of what is happening in the game, but also to encourage readers to study the games properly by thinking about how they would continue before looking at the next diagram. Doing this requires some time and discipline, but it will repay you handsomely in terms of strengthening your play. Frequent queries about what to do next are intended to remind you to do this. You will also be surprised to discover how much more fully you understand these games as a result of the unusually full commentary.

Zhou has a particular talent for helping weaker players understand what is going on in pro games and guiding them to become stronger players by studying pro games. He intentionally includes kyu players in his intended audience, not just stronger players. Zhou can be contacted through his web site at www.zhouyuan.com.

About the Author

Yuan Zhou is one of the strongest go players in the US. He has won many titles since coming to the US in 1989 from his native China, where he was in training to become a professional player. He has represented the US in several international tournaments, including the World Amateur Championship in 2012 and the 4th Korea Prime Minister Cup in 2009 in which he placed fifth. Zhou is also a popular teacher and lecturer.

William Cobb, January 2013

Copyright Page

© 2013 by Yuan Zhou

All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part is prohibited.

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Edited by William Cobb

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Conversion to SmartGo Books by William Cobb

Table of Contents

Deep Thought: Extremely Thorough Commentaries on Pro Games, Volume Two

Introduction

Copyright Page

Yamashiro Hiroshi vs. Kong Xiangming

The chapters in gray are included only in the full book.

Chen Yaoye vs. Cho Chikun

Rin Kaiho vs. Ishida Yoshio

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About SmartGo Books

Yamashiro Hiroshi vs. Kong Xiangming

Kong Xiangming 8p is a top female player in China, who won the first National Women’s title in 1978 and recently won the first Women’s Guoshou title at the age of 57—a remarkable achievement. She is the former wife of Nie Weiping 9p and has been called the female version of Go Seigen. She spent a number of years in Japan and her son is a pro in Japan.

Yamashiro Hiroshi 9p, a strong pro in Japan, challenged for several major titles, including the Kisei (losing to Kobayashi Koichi 3–4 in 1992) and three times for the Honinbo (1986, 1987, 1993) as well as others. In 1987 he won five games in a row in the China-Japan Super Go series. In 1985 he won the Okan title, which is limited to members of the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in, and was promoted to 9p. Yamashiro is a solidly territorial player. At the time of this game (1978) Yamashiro was a 6p and Kong was still unranked. When she was awarded a rank she started as a 6p.

This match was a friendship team event between the Chinese and Japanese in 1978, before there were any international titles. The teams included both female and male players. There had been no cross-gender pairings in the match, but Kong had defeated all the Japanese women so a male player from Japan was scheduled to play her. The komi was five and a half points. Yamashiro was Black.

Moves 1–4

＞＜ ▶︎

The first four opening plays are common. Black starts with a nirensei (two star points) opening and White plays facing 3–4 points (komoku). [This white opening was one of Go Seigen’s favorites.]

The Japanese were the top players in the world in those days and of course had studied 3–4 point joseki very thoroughly. As a result it took courage for Kong to challenge a strong Japanese pro with two 3–4 points.

Move 5

＞＜ ▶︎

Black makes a high approach with 5.

Move 6

＞＜ ▶︎

And White pincers with 6. This sets up the famous Magic Sword joseki, which is extremely complicated and risky. At the pro level, a mistake in this joseki can be the end of the game.

Move 7

＞＜ ▶︎

Black 7 is the most complicated version of this joseki. [For weaker players, the safest play for Black 7 is at A. See diagram Easy Magic Sword.] Black’s aim is to confine the fighting to the upper left corner without involving the entire left side where White has Black outnumbered.

Easy Magic Sword

＞＜ ▶︎

After White 6 this sequence is obviously good for White who is making territory while Black is just floating at this point. Hence, Black must use his previous plays by counter-attacking with Black 7. However, in this case the attack with Black 7 is not so good since there is a white stone in the corner below and White can attack Black 7 with White 8. The overall situation remains better for White, but Black can avoid the enormous complications of the Magic Sword this way. In amateur play, if you have not studied the magic sword thoroughly and someone throws it at you, and you think your opponent may have studied this joseki, this is probably your best response.

Move 8

＞＜ ▶︎

White 8 aims to separate Black, which is normal. Making and breaking connections usually has the highest priority. Black could now cut White by playing at A, which would be followed by White B. In that case, White’s corner would already be alive so the fight would be good for White and hard for Black.

Move 9

＞＜ ▶︎

Black has to play more defensively since White was in this corner first.

Move 10

＞＜ ▶︎

White continues to aim at separating Black.

Move 11

＞＜ ▶︎

Black 11 makes use of the aji of , but Black’s aim is to give up and settle down in the corner. [The classical advice is that when you are outnumbered you should play light (avoiding heavy shapes) and not get in trouble. Making a small sacrifice is often part of this strategy.]

Move 12

＞＜ ▶︎

White protects his connection with 12 and aims for territory on the top edge.

Move 13

＞＜ ▶︎

Black 13 also uses the aji of , threatening a push and cut that would capture the two stones.

How should White continue?

Move 14

＞＜ ▶︎

So White cuts off with 14, avoiding being sealed in.

Move 15

＞＜ ▶︎

Now Black can move into the corner with 15, seeking a base.

Move 16

＞＜ ▶︎

White keeps her stones solidly connected with 16.

There are two major variations in this joseki for Black after this: at A or at B. The advantage for Black of A is that it protects both of the cutting points at C and D. See diagram Black Protects. Black A also restricts White’s access to the corner, since, after Black A, Black can block a white play at B. This is why protecting the two cutting points with Black A is better than protecting them at Black E. Black A is a highly efficient move—but it is defensive. Black B is more active. It would make Black’s corner bigger and open up the possibility of a monkey jump to reduce White’s potential on the top edge. A monkey jump in this case would be worth eight points in sente to Black which is significantly better than what Black would get after playing A and then having to block White B.

Black Protects

＞＜ ▶︎

Black 1 protects the cutting point of A and if White cuts at 2, Black can capture the white cutting stones.

Move 17

＞＜ ▶︎

Black chooses the potentially much more valuable play at 17, but it leaves Black with the problem of a potential cut by White at A. This raises an important ladder issue. See diagram If White Cuts.

If White Cuts

＞＜ ▶︎

Note the very nice tesuji of White 5. Black 6 is the only way for Black to prevent a white cut at Black 10 and a white hane at Black 8. This becomes a capturing race. White has four liberties and Black has five. However, there is an issue on the outside. If White cuts at 13, Black’s three stones on the edge have only three liberties and the two outside black stones have only two liberties. This becomes very complicated. Black cannot afford to lose either the two or the three stones since the corner would also die in either case, which would be a disaster for Black. The ladder involving the two stones becomes very important. Black would save the three inside stones, starting with Black 14, and White should start the ladder with White 17. If this ladder is good for White, the game is over. In this case the ladder is good for Black so in the game Black can descend with (move 17 in the game).

However, the story is not over yet. There is a whole board issue. White can survive losing the six inside stones on the upper left edge since White’s other stones in the upper left are outside. So White can play a ladder breaker with 17 at A, for example. Black would have no choice but to respond at White 17 to survive in the upper left and White can then gain a huge advantage in the lower right by playing a second attack stone at B. This raises a difficult issue about whether White would be better off this way. It is hard to judge the value of White’s ruining the potential of Black’s 4–4 stone in the lower right corner in both directions.

Nowadays more players would choose to cut with White 1 in this situation. Since White C would be sente and Black would have to finish capturing the six white stones in the capturing race, White’s loss in the upper left would not be as big as it might appear. Nevertheless, it is not easy for White to choose to make this sacrifice, especially before players had had the advantage of a lot of recent study of the position.

Move 18

＞＜ ▶︎

The diagram If White Cuts explains why White continues at 18. This move makes the potential ladder shown in diagram If White Cuts good for White instead of Black—a typical example of whole board thinking. See diagram If White Attaches for why White 18 is not at A.

If White Attaches

＞＜ ▶︎

If White attaches at 1 instead of playing White 18 in the game at the point of Black 6 here, the situation is more complicated. Black has the option of playing the hane at Black 2. Since Black gains a lot with Black 2, if White now cuts at 3, Black might play at Black 4, giving up the center. After White connects with 5, Black 6 makes White’s loss in the lower right even greater. Black is alive on the upper left edge, of course, so this would be a very risky way for White. The game play at 18 means that White is not risking so much—White 18 is a normal approach move.

This is a good example of the kind of judgments players face that make go difficult. Finding a balanced path through such alternatives is never easy. The problem is knowing when to do what. The Magic Sword is not an easy joseki to play.

Move 19

＞＜ ▶︎

Given the previous explanations, Black 19 makes sense. Normally, Black would not play this way—19 is a very odd response to an approach move to the 4–4 stone. Black A or B would be a normal response. The game move is taking care of the ladder situation, countering White’s ladder breaker. Black 19 makes the ladder good for Black again. [These moves would be quite mysterious if you did not understand this situation.]

Move 20

＞＜ ▶︎

Without the ladder situation in the upper left, White would continue in the lower right with 20. However, because of the ladder situation, White has several forcing moves in the lower right threatening to break the ladder so White can play elsewhere, holding the lower right forcing moves in reserve. This makes quite strong. Black cannot attack this stone because White’s defensive responses will be sente. [You must figure out what is going on to understand pro moves. Pros do not make random moves just to see what will happen.]

Move 21

＞＜ ▶︎

Now you understand why Black fixes the problem with Black 21. He cannot continue to play with the burden of the threatened, devastating ladder. It would be like having one arm tied behind his back—no way to fight. [A basic principle of “honte” play, that is, correct according to traditional theory, is to fix your own problems before attacking the opponent’s weaknesses.] Black 21 makes the result in the upper left a very good result for Black: Black’s corner is secure, White won’t be able to prevent the monkey jump on the top left edge since A will not be sente, and loses its purpose. So White has to find adequate compensation with sente.

Actually, later study shows that Black could wait one more move before defending the cutting point, playing at B with 21. White must respond at C, then Black can play at 21. This would be even better for Black. White’s upper left group would be weaker.

Move 22

＞＜ ▶︎

Attacking Black’s corner with a double approach makes sense as a way for White to gain compensation.

How should Black continue?

Move 23

＞＜ ▶︎

Black follows the general rule for dealing with a double approach by leaning on the stronger stone with 23, aiming to build up strength to attack the weaker stone. This is the correct direction for Black to play.

Move 24

＞＜ ▶︎

The hane with White 24 is a normal response.

How should Black continue?

Move 25

＞＜ ▶︎

Black 25 is a mistake, a wrong choice of joseki. Black’s other choice here is to stand up at A, which is correct. See diagram The Correct Joseki.

The Correct Joseki

＞＜ ▶︎

This is the joseki Black should choose in this situation. White takes the corner and ends with sente in this joseki, but Black gets thickness. Locally, White is a little better—White took the corner Black played in first and White’s two stones have some aji. It is reasonable for White to get some compensation after Black defends the cutting point in the upper left. However, the direction of his right side thickness is good for Black. With the ladder problem resolved, becomes weak. In the game, Black decided to focus on territory and defend the corner, but this variation would have been better for him.

Move 26

＞＜ ▶︎

White 26 is a key move now and is quite big.

Should Black connect?

Move 27

＞＜ ▶︎

Black must connect with 27 to avoid a much larger loss. This gives Black the corner and White’s outside stones have cutting points, which makes them weak. However, all of Black’s moves are inside, which is not good.

What should White do now?

Move 28

＞＜ ▶︎

White 28 is the correct continuation in this case. Black is sealed into the corner and the top becomes an area of excellent potential for White. After White 28, a cut at A would be less severe than one at B so White would like to connect at B next, which would create problems for Black’s corner and enhance White’s prospects on the right side.

Move 29

＞＜ ▶︎

So Black has to cut now at 29.

How should White respond?

Move 30

＞＜ ▶︎

If White plays atari at A instead of extending at 30, Black will capture . That would leave White with outside cutting points that need protecting while also settling Black’s corner. After White 30 Black cannot cut at B because of the ladder which favors White. Further advantages of playing White 30 will become apparent later.

What should Black do now?

Move 31

＞＜ ▶︎

Another reason for Black’s playing the way he has in the upper right corner is that he can reduce White’s top area with 31. It might look like Black 31 would allow White to make a big territory at the top by playing at A. However, that would not be good for White because the potential for a monkey jump at B by Black makes the potential territory for White here relatively small. After defending against Black B, White A would be very close to thickness and inefficient. Black’s aim is to come back and attack if White defends at the top with a move like A, which would be good for Black. Black was aiming at this development when he chose to play as he did in the upper right corner. However, White does not cooperate and makes an unexpected response to Black 31.

How would you play?

Move 32

＞＜ ▶︎

The turn with White 32 is a very good move, showing excellent understanding on White’s part. White is showing the importance of counterattacking instead of just defending. When White cuts off , Black is surprised and becomes impatient. See diagram What Black Should Do.

What Black Should Do

＞＜ ▶︎

Later study of this famous game shows that Black should respond to White’s turn with by jumping to Black 1. White would jump to 2 and Black should then jump to Black 3. This way, Black would severely reduce White’s potential at the top while White gets potential on the left side, and the game would still be even.

Move 33

＞＜ ▶︎

Because Black’s upper left corner is very strong and White’s group here is unsettled, Black decides to seal White in with 33. This is strong and aggressive play, aiming to attack White’s upper left group.

This exchange is a good example of the attitude of strong players, showing how they think about the game. The initial inclination of strong players is always to attack rather than to defend. This may sometimes get them in trouble, but it is one of the main reasons they are stronger players and one of the main deficiencies in the thinking of weaker players.

Move 34

＞＜ ▶︎

White correctly fights back without hesitation. Black must be separated. See diagram How Not to Play.

How Not to Play

＞＜ ▶︎

If White goes back to defend at White 1 and lets Black connect at 2, the result is not likely to go well for White. This situation would offer much better possibilities for Black than for White. Fighting back is almost always the better choice.

End of sample chapter. In the book, all three games are commented to the end.