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Modern Master Games, Volume 2

The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol

Part One: Games One to Five

Commentaries compiled by Rob van Zeijst
Edited by Richard Bozulich

Kiseido Publishing Company
Chigasaki, Japan

Buy the full book at gobooks.com

This book features the historic match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol, two players who have dominated go in the first decade of the 21st century. For years, these two have been rivals, competing for the top spots in numerous international tournaments. Both are famous for their severe attacks and their fighting skills. Gu has a thick style accompanied by an exquisite feeling for the opening from which he often emerges with an advantage. In contrast Lee plays a fast, profit-oriented game, leaving behind thin positions. This means that his groups often come under attack. Most players would collapse under Gu’s relentless attacks, but this brings Lee’s game to life and he creatively finds the best possible way to settle these groups or to somehow escape with them. This contrast in style and especially Lee’s daring strategies in the middle game are what make the games in this book especially fascinating and give birth to innovative moves and spectacular fights.

The games are analyzed in great detail so the reader can understand the thinking behind each move. The reader can also find the most recent innovation and analysis of the mini-Chinese opening. In addition, an important new strategic concept, ‘risk management’, is introduced and studied for the first time in any publication.

Copyright Page

Modern Master Games, Volume 2
The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol
Part One: Games One to Five

by Rob van Zeijst

Copyright © 2014 by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

All rights reserved according to international law. No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or electronic process, nor may it be stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use without the written permission from Kiseido Publishing Company.

Published by
Kiseido Publishing Company
Kagawa 4–48–32
Chigasaki-shi, Kanagawa-ken
Japan 253–0082

ISBN of the printed version: 978–4–906574–92–6

Converted for SmartGo Books by John Mifsud.

Contents

The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol
Part One: Games One to Five

Copyright Page

Preface

Match Conditions

Profiles of the Players

Editorial

Game One

The chapters in gray are included only in the full book.

Game Two

Game Three

Game Four

Game Five

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Preface

Go fans from around the world have long awaited this showdown between the top two go players in the world, Gu Li and Lee Sedol (transliterated as Yi Se-tol in other publications), who are battling for a $820,000 prize, the richest in go history, to be paid by the sponsor of this match, the MLily Mattress Company.

Why a Ten-Game Match?

I mentioned to a friend that one of the most exciting go matches in the last 70 years was being played to determine the world’s strongest go player. I also mentioned that it was a 10-game match, to which he immediately replied that was the stupidest thing he had ever heard: ‘Don’t you guys realize there is a chance that it could turn out to be a 5–5 tie?’

I was so taken aback at his reaction that I couldn’t come up with a good answer. I lamely retorted that it was a traditional Japanese thing. He said that this lack of rationality was so typical of Japan. They prefer tradition to an actual solution. (I should add that my friend is Japanese, but he grew up in the USA.) I said that it was actually organized by a Chinese sponsor and that the two players were a Chinese and a Korean. He just shrugged his shoulders in disgust. I tried to give him a rational explanation by saying that a best-of-nine or -eleven match would give an arbitrary result, especially because the winning ratio with Black and White is slightly different. Moreover, the possibility of a tie would save face for equally strong opponents. He thought that this was nonsense. All he wanted was a winner.

Thinking about this on the way home, all the good arguments that I should have presented came to mind. The purpose of a match is to determine who the stronger player is. If they are of equal strength and they fight to a tie, so be it. If a winner is needed to crown a holder of a title, then a best-of-three, -five, or -seven match is more appropriate, and there are a lot of those matches already.

In chess, world championship matches have always had an even number of games. In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, the matches consisted of 24 games. Two matches ended in ties, but the majority usually produced a clear winner. The most recent such match was a 12-game affair. The problem with chess is that many games end in draws, so the chances of the match ending in a tie are greatly increased. Therefore, if matches with an even number of games have been successful for chess, they should be even more appropriate for go matches, where draws are rare, even in non-komi games.

Throughout the history of go in the Edo period (1603–1868), all matches ever held have consisted of an even number of games. There have been six-game, ten-game, 20-game, 30-game, and even 60-game matches. Except for two, these matches were never finished, but most produced clear winners. The only exception was a six-game match, which ended in a tie (Black won each game). This is also what happened in the first Honinbo title match played in 1941. That match consisted of six games as well and it ended in a 3–3 tie with Black winning every game. The conclusion we might draw from this is that the players were of equal strength, or six games is not enough to produce a clear-cut winner. In the 1940s and 50s, Go Seigen played a number of ten-game matches with the top players of that era, winning all of them. (A history of go in the Edo period can be found in The Go Players Almanac. Details of the first Honinbo tournament and title match can be found in Modern Master Games, Volume One, The Dawn of Tournament Go.)

Rob van Zeijst

Match Conditions

Prize Money: $820,000 guaranteed by the sponsor MLily Mattress Company. It is rumored that the division of the prize money will be 95% for the winner and 5% for the loser. Apparently, Lee insisted on this division because he believes he will win the match.

Komi: 6½ points.

Time: 4 hours each plus 60 seconds per move byo-yomi (overtime). The final five minutes of a player’s 4-hour time allowance are allocated to byo-yomi, to be used in one-minute units. The elapsed seconds are read out by the time keeper. If the time keeper reaches 60 seconds, the player’s byo-yomi is reduced by one minute. If this happens on the final minute, the player loses on time.

Rules: The Chinese Rules.

Profiles of the Players

Gu Li was born on February 3, 1982 in China. He became 1-dan in 1995 and was awarded the top rank of 9-dan in 2006 when he won the 10th LG Cup. Besides the LG Cup (which he won again in 2009), he has won all the main international titles, namely, the 6th Chunlan Cup (2007), the 21st Fujitsu Cup (2008), the 1st BC Card Cup (2009), 4th Toyota Denso World Oza (2009), and the 15th Samsung Cup (2010). From 2003 to 2009, he dominated the two main domestic Chinese titles: the 17th to 22nd Tianyuan title and the 17th to 22nd Mingren title. Since 2005, he has been rated as China’s top (or near the top) player. At the end of 2013 he was tied for number one with Tuo Jiaxi.

Lee Sedol was born on March 2, 1983. He became 1-dan in 1995 and was awarded the top rank of 9-dan in 2003 when he won the 15th Fujitsu Cup. He has an impressive record in international tournaments, having won 13 in total. He won the Fujitsu Cup three times (2002, 2003, 2005), the LG Cup twice (2003, 2008), the Samsung Cup four times (2004, 2007, 2008, 2012), the Toyota Denso World Oza twice (2004, 2006), the BC Card Cup twice (2010, 2011), and the Chunlan Cup once (2011).

At the start of this match Gu and Lee played a total of 35 games, with Lee winning 18 of them. There is another game between them, but that one is not counted because it ended in a quadruple ko and was officially recorded as a ‘no result’.

Editorial

Commentaries are based on comments from top Chinese, Korean, and Japanese professionals, compiled and expanded upon by Rob van Zeijst.

Rob van Zeijst is an ex-insei (apprentice professional) and has won the European championship three times. He has played in a number of international tournaments: the Fujitsu Cup four times; the Chunlan Cup once; the Samsung Cup four times in which he won two games against Korean professionals. His highest rating in the Chinese Professional ranking system was professional 3-dan.

Richard Bozulich is the chairman of Kiseido Publishing Company.

Game One

The first game was played in Beijing, on January 26, 2014. In attendance was the legendary Chinese player Nie Weiping 9-dan, who was the nemesis of the top Japanese players during the 70s and 80s. His presence most likely was to provide encouragement and inspiration to Gu, his former disciple. In Lee’s corner were his wife and daughter, who traveled from Canada, where his daughter was studying, to cheer him on.

White: Gu Li 9-dan

Black: Lee Se-dol 9-dan

Played on January 26, 2014 in Beijing, China

Figure 1 (1–7)

Lee started out with Black 7, the latest version of the mini-Chinese opening (recently dubbed the micro-Chinese opening). Black 7 at A is the usual move associated with this opening, but Black 7 in the game is closer to the stone at 3, so the corner is more tightly defended.

Dia. 1

Black 1 to 8 in Dia. 1 show how the mini-Chinese opening was played in the early stages of its development. There were many games in which Black 3 was played at ‘a’.

Dia. 2

Before White 4 in Dia. 1 became the standard move, a number of games were played in which White made the knight’s move of 4 in Dia. 2. However, Black can secure a large territory with 5 to 13, so this move was deemed unsatisfactory.

Dia. 3

Instead of 5 in Dia. 1, Black 5 to White 12 in Dia. 3 is a variation that is very popular these days. After White 12, Black can strengthen his moyo with a move around ‘a’. Instead of 10, however, White can cut at ‘b’ and start a violent fight with hair-raising variations. To better deal with this cut, Black ‘c’ (7 in Figure 1) has been gaining popularity.

Dia. 4

Instead of 6 in Dia. 3, professionals have been experimenting with the variation in which White attaches at 6 in Dia. 4 before pushing up with 8 and extending to 10. The result is roughly even. The stone at 6 retains aji for later.

Figure 2 (8–10)

Gu plays 8 and 10, which are typical of his aggressive style. White 8 is meant to make Black’s stone heavy before attacking with 10. Rather than playing 8 first, playing immediately at 10 is more common. However, the drawback is that Black will attach to the left of 8 to settle his group quickly. Clearly Gu wanted to start a fight.

Dia. 5

White 1 in Dia. 5 is the normal move to deal with the mini-Chinese opening. The sequence to Black 6 is natural. Although cutting through with White 7 and 9 is worrisome, Black can deal with it by playing 10 to 14. Black’s marked stone is now in a better position to capture the stones at 9 and 13 than if it were at ‘a’.

Dia. 6

An alternative to White 8 and 10 in Figure 2 is for White to first stake out a position at the top with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. Black can then play a splitting move with 4 to establish a position on the left side. Instead of 4, Black ‘a’ and ‘b’ are also possible.

Figure 3 (11–16)

Black 11 probably took Gu by surprise. He was looking for a fight at the bottom, but Lee was ignoring him. However, from Black’s perspective, this is the ultimate expression of kiai, an important concept covered in Kiseido’s best-selling book Fight Like a Pro — The Secrets of Kiai.

In general, forcing the exchange of 14 for 15 before playing at 16, looks a bit like an overplay. However, White wants to play 16 anyway, so he could interpret the exchange of 14 for 15 as an ‘inducing move’ — an exchange that makes White 16 more natural. This is sometimes called the ‘natural flow’ and inducing this type of flow generally implies great efficiency. So there are two sides to this story. However, on a practical level, White has one more argument up his sleeve (see Dia. 11).

Dia. 7

Instead of 11 in Figure 3, Black can easily save his stones by running away with 1 to 7 in Dia. 7. White would then probably play at ‘a’ and the next fight would start.

There is no reason for Black to shy away from this variation, except that it would mean Lee playing the moves that Gu wants him to play. This is the antithesis of kiai.

Dia. 8

If White plays 1 in Dia. 8 after Black 11 in Figure 3, Black can easily avoid a direct confrontation with 2 , which sets up a loose link-up at the bottom. Later, Black can fight with ‘a’–White ‘b’–Black ‘c’.

Dia. 9

White could stop Black from linking up underneath with 1 in Dia. 9, but that would provide Black with the perfect opportunity to escape with 2 and 4. If the sequence to 8 follows, it is true that a white move at ‘a’ would be slightly more severe than without Black’s stone at 1 in Dia. 7. However, White’s move at 1 in this diagram is slack; spending an entire move on this point is not justified.

Dia. 10

If White reverses the order of 14 and 16 in Figure 3 and exchanges the shoulder hit of 1 in Dia. 10 for 2, Black might not jump to 4 after White 3. Instead, he could form a nearly unbreakable link by playing at ‘a’ or defend the right side with ‘b’.

Figure 4 (17–20)

Black 17 is a calm and composed move, showing that Black is fully aware of White’s intentions and thwarting problems before they appear.

White 18 prevents Black’s two stones at the bottom from linking up while providing some support to his stone on the right.

Now is the time for Black to attach at 19 and escape with his two stones on the bottom left.

Dia. 11

Instead of 17, if Black tries to link up underneath with 1 in Dia. 11, White can force the exchange of 2 for 3, then cut off the two black stones on the left with 4 to 8, securing a large territory on the bottom left with 10. However, before doing so, White would play at ‘a’ to see how the situation on the right would turn out. At the appropriate time, he would then play the sequence shown here.

Dia. 12

Instead of 19 in Figure 4, invading the corner with Black 1 in Dia. 12, followed by the hane of 3, is a common technique to make sabaki in this kind of a position. However, this would help White reinforce his stones with 2 and 4. If Black now attaches with 5, White can cut off the two black stones below with 6. This would be a disaster for Black.

Dia. 13

After Black attaches with 19 in Figure 4, if White crudely cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, Black cuts with 4 and 6. White has no choice but to connect with 7, so Black can capture with 8, greatly weakening White’s marked stone. This would also be a disaster for White.

Figure 5 (21–27)

After Black pushes up with 21, White keeps up the attack on the outside with 22, threatening to cut off Black’s two stones below, so Black links up with 23 and 25.

After White defends with 26, Black moves out into the center with 27.

Dia. 14

Instead of 22, White might cut with 1 in Dia. 14. After Black cuts with 6, he gets a lot of forcing moves with 10 to 20, though White won’t collapse. Finally, Black defends with 22. Not only is Black’s influence greater than White’s profit, White still has to worry about the aji of Black ‘a’.

Dia. 15

Instead of 23 in Figure 5, extending to Black 1 in Dia. 15 is a mistake because White can cut Black into two with 2 and 4. After the sequence to 8, Black’s stones on the bottom left are doomed because White can escape with ‘a’ or ‘b’.

Figure 6 (28–37)

With 28, White tries to score some points in the corner: he hopes to force Black to defend in such a way that it becomes more natural for White to make a defensive move in the center. Again, this looks like the natural flow.

Up to here, the consensus was that White was doing a little better, but Lee played a clever sequence starting with 31 and culminating with the brilliant tesuji of Black 39 in Figure 7.

White 30 was too tight. This move should have been played at A.

With 31, Black initiates a sequence that gives him a very small advantage, eventually providing a little extra profit that only becomes apparent some 150 moves later. White 34 is the only move.