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Modern Master Games, Volume 3

The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol

Part Two: Games Six to Eight

Commentaries by Michael Redmond 9-dan & Rob van Zeijst
Edited by Richard Bozulich

Kiseido Publishing Company
Chigasaki, Japan

Buy the full book at gobooks.com

Part Two of this series features the final three games of the historic match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol, two players who have dominated go in the first decade of the 21st century. For years, these two have been rivals, competing for the top spots in numerous international tournaments. Both are famous for their severe attacks and their fighting skills. Gu has a thick style accompanied by an exquisite feeling for the opening from which he often emerges with an advantage. In contrast Lee plays a fast, profit-oriented game, leaving behind thin positions. This means that his groups often come under attack. Most players would collapse under Gu’s relentless attacks, but this brings Lee’s game to life and he creatively finds the best possible way to settle these groups or to somehow escape with them. This contrast in style and especially Lee’s daring strategies in the middle game are what make the games in this book especially fascinating and give birth to innovative moves and spectacular fights.

As a bonus, two games played between Gu and Lee in other tournaments while their ten-game match was in progress are presented.

The games are analyzed in exhaustive detail so the reader can understand the thinking behind each move. In this volume you will find the most recent innovation and analysis of the high Chinese opening and the sanrensei opening.

Copyright Page

Modern Master Games, Volume 3
The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol
Part Two: Games Six to Eight

by Michael Redmond 9-dan & Rob van Zeijst

Copyright © 2015 by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

All rights reserved according to international law. No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or electronic process, nor may it be stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use without the written permission from Kiseido Publishing Company.

Published by
Kiseido Publishing Company
Kagawa 4–48–32
Chigasaki-shi, Kanagawa-ken
Japan 253–0082

ISBN of the printed version: 978–4–906574–93–3

Converted for SmartGo Books by John Mifsud.

Contents

The 2014 Ten-Game Match between Gu Li and Lee Sedol
Part Two: Games Six to Eight

Copyright Page

Preface

Match Conditions

Profiles of the Players

Commentaries

Game Six

The chapters in gray are included only in the full book.

Game Seven

Game Eight

Supplementary Games

The 4th Zhaoshang Cup

The 10th Chunlan Cup

A Brief Glossary of Go Terms and Concepts

Go Books from Kiseido

Buy This Book

About SmartGo Books

Preface

Go fans from around the world have long awaited this showdown between the top two go players in the world, Gu Li and Lee Sedol (transliterated as Yi Se-tol in other publications), who are battling for a $820,000 prize, the richest in go history, to be paid by the sponsor of this match, the MLily Mattress Company.

Why a Ten-Game Match?

I mentioned to a friend that one of the most exciting go matches in the last 70 years was being played to determine the world’s strongest go player. I also mentioned that it was a 10-game match, to which he immediately replied that was the stupidest thing he had ever heard: ‘Don’t you guys realize there is a chance that it could turn out to be a 5–5 tie?’

I was so taken aback at his reaction that I couldn’t come up with a good answer. I lamely retorted that it was a traditional Japanese thing. He said that this lack of rationality was so typical of Japan. They prefer tradition to an actual solution. (I should add that my friend is Japanese, but he grew up in the USA.) I said that it was actually organized by a Chinese sponsor and that the two players were a Chinese and a Korean. He just shrugged his shoulders in disgust. I tried to give him a rational explanation by saying that a best-of-nine or -eleven match would give an arbitrary result, especially because the winning ratio with Black and White is slightly different. Moreover, the possibility of a tie would save face for equally strong opponents. He thought that this was nonsense. All he wanted was a winner.

Thinking about this on the way home, all the good arguments that I should have presented came to mind. The purpose of a match is to determine who the stronger player is. If they are of equal strength and they fight to a tie, so be it. If a winner is needed to crown a holder of a title, then a best-of-three, -five, or -seven match is more appropriate, and there are a lot of those matches already.

In chess, world championship matches have always had an even number of games. In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, the matches consisted of 24 games. Two matches ended in ties, but the majority usually produced a clear winner. The most recent such match was a 12-game affair. The problem with chess is that many games end in draws, so the chances of the match ending in a tie are greatly increased. Therefore, if matches with an even number of games have been successful for chess, they should be even more appropriate for go matches, where draws are rare, even in non-komi games.

Throughout the history of go in the Edo period (1603–1868), all matches ever held have consisted of an even number of games. There have been six-game, ten-game, 20-game, 30-game, and even 60-game matches. Except for two, these matches were never finished, but most produced clear winners. The only exception was a six-game match, which ended in a tie (Black won each game). This is also what happened in the first Honinbo title match played in 1941. That match consisted of six games as well and it ended in a 3–3 tie with Black winning every game. The conclusion we might draw from this is that the players were of equal strength, or six games is not enough to produce a clear-cut winner. In the 1940s and 50s, Go Seigen played a number of ten-game matches with the top players of that era, winning all of them. (A history of go in the Edo period can be found in The Go Players Almanac. Details of the first Honinbo tournament and title match can be found in Modern Master Games, Volume One, The Dawn of Tournament Go.)

Rob van Zeijst

Match Conditions

Prize Money: $820,000 guaranteed by the sponsor MLily Mattress Company. It is rumored that the division of the prize money will be 95% for the winner and 5% for the loser. Apparently, Lee insisted on this division because he believes he will win the match.

Komi: 6½ points.

Time: 4 hours each plus 60 seconds per move byo-yomi (overtime). The final five minutes of a player’s 4-hour time allowance are allocated to byo-yomi, to be used in one-minute units. The elapsed seconds are read out by the time keeper. If the time keeper reaches 60 seconds, the player’s byo-yomi is reduced by one minute. If this happens on the final minute, the player loses on time.

Rules: The Chinese Rules.

Profiles of the Players

Gu Li was born on February 3, 1982 in China. He became 1-dan in 1995 and was awarded the top rank of 9-dan in 2006 when he won the 10th LG Cup. Besides the LG Cup (which he won again in 2009), he has won all the main international titles, namely, the 6th Chunlan Cup (2007), the 21st Fujitsu Cup (2008), the 1st BC Card Cup (2009), 4th Toyota Denso World Oza (2009), and the 15th Samsung Cup (2010). From 2003 to 2009, he dominated the two main domestic Chinese titles: the 17th to 22nd Tianyuan title and the 17th to 22nd Mingren title. Since 2005, he has been rated as China’s top (or near the top) player. At the end of 2013 he was tied for number one with Tuo Jiaxi.

Lee Sedol was born on March 2, 1983. He became 1-dan in 1995 and was awarded the top rank of 9-dan in 2003 when he won the 15th Fujitsu Cup. He has an impressive record in international tournaments, having won 13 in total. He won the Fujitsu Cup three times (2002, 2003, 2005), the LG Cup twice (2003, 2008), the Samsung Cup four times (2004, 2007, 2008, 2012), the Toyota Denso World Oza twice (2004, 2006), the BC Card Cup twice (2010, 2011), and the Chunlan Cup once (2011).

At the start of this match Gu and Lee played a total of 35 games, with Lee winning 18 of them. There is another game between them, but that one is not counted because it ended in a quadruple ko and was officially recorded as a ‘no result’.

Commentaries

Commentaries are based on analyses by Michael Redmond in collaboration with Rob van Zeijst. Editing by Richard Bozulich.

Michael Redmond was born in California on May 25, 1963. Started studying to become a professional go player in 1978 as a disciple of Oeda Yusuke 9-dan. Became 1-dan in 1981 and 9-dan in 2000. He is the third Westerner to become a professional in Japan and the most successful one to date. In 2009, he reached a milestone of 500 wins in Japanese professional tournaments.

In 1991, he reached the quarter finals of the 4th Fujitsu Cup World Go Championship, and, in 1993, the quarter finals in 5th Dongyang Securities World Cup.

His best results in Japanese tournaments for players under 25 were first place in the 9th Ryuen Cup, a lightning go tournament (1985), second place in the 5th NEC Shun-Ei Cup (NEC Rising Stars) (1990), and second place in the 17th Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars) (1992).

His best results in Japanese tournaments for all professionals were perfect records in the 1984 and 1989 Oteai promotion tournaments and the semifinals of the 28th Gosei challenger’s tournament (2003).

He is the author of several books in Japanese and one in English: Patterns of the Sanrensei, published in SmartGo Books.

Rob van Zeijst is an ex-insei (apprentice professional) and has won the European championship three times. He has played in a number of international tournaments: the Fujitsu Cup four times; the Chunlan Cup once; the Samsung Cup four times in which he won two games against Korean professionals. His highest rating in the Chinese Professional ranking system was professional 3-dan.

Richard Bozulich is the chairman of Kiseido Publishing Company.

Game Six

Before this match started, opinions were divided on which one of these two pillars of international go was the stronger. Many comments have been made about the imbalance in Lee’s style. His opening is supposed to be 5-dan at best, but, since he is a top 9-dan, one might conclude that his middle game strength must be 13-dan.

In this series, Gu usually came out of the opening with a better position. This was followed by fights that erupted all over the board. Gu is a good fighter, but he often loses his concentration after four or five hours of play. In contrast, Lee seems to thrive as the middle game progresses, constantly challenging his opponent with moves that are on the fine line between overplays and brilliancies. Lee is like a tornado that cataclysmically changes the landscape and the balance of power in the blink of an eye, with important groups being exchanged. Only players with great confidence can keep their composure in the midst of so much confusion.

White: Lee Se-dol 9-dan

Black: Gu Li 9-dan

Played on July 27, 2014 in Liuan, Anhui Province, China.

Figure 1 (1–7)

The placement of 2 is significant in the sense that White can modify his strategy in the lower left, depending on where Black plays in the lower right. If White plays 2 at 4, Black can play a diagonal opening by taking a point in the lower left corner with 3. However, Black 3 is one of Gu’s favorite moves.

The enclosure of Black 5 is played a lot recently.

These days approaching at 6 is common sense.

A pincer around 7 is also a common strategy. Various top pros have experimented with A, B, C, and 7. All of these candidates have their pros and cons; it is more a question of personal preference than correctness.

Dia. 1

Instead of 2 in Figure 1, if White plays at the marked stone, Black can play a diagonal opening by occupying the lower left corner with 1 in Dia. 1. White then occupies the empty corner with 2, and Black can be the first to make an approach move with 3. This may be slightly advantageous for Black because he gets the initiative on the left side.

Dia. 2

Instead of 5 in Figure 1, Black can also approach with 1 in Dia. 2. If White defends with 2, Black can set up the mini-Chinese opening with 3. We saw a similar opening in Game One.

Dia. 3

Splitting Black’s position on the right side with White 1 in Dia. 3 is seldom played nowadays. Previously, Black used to answer White 1 by making a checking extension to 3 and White would extend to ‘a’ or ‘b’. Nowadays, Black’s enclosure is viewed as thickness, so Black 2 is the commonsense move. (Don’t approach thickness!) After White extends to 3, Black can play the moves from 4 to 10 whenever he wants. White will probably answer with 11 and 13, but Black gets the initiative and sets up a nice moyo with 16. This is an excellent result for Black because all of his stones are working efficiently while White’s stones are overconcentrated and ineffective.

Dia. 4

Instead of 7 in Figure 1, Black can also defend at 1 in Dia. 4. In general, White will slide into the corner with 2. Next, Black 3 is a good move because Black gets an excellent result with the moves through 11. White 12 breaks the ladder while Black 13 changes the direction of the ladder — this is more efficient than just capturing.

The moves from 14 to 21 are a possible follow-up; it is shown as an illustration of what could happen. The result is more or less even. Often game analyses are limited to what happens in that particular game and talk too little about what could happen. It is a good practice to consider not just why a certain move is played but what would happen if it were played elsewhere. This makes it easier to understand the rationale behind certain moves, especially when the normal move leads to a bad result.

Figure 2 (8–19)

The high double approach of White 8 has become popular recently. The attachment of Black 9 is the standard response. Instead of playing a hane at 12, immediately invading the corner with 10 has also become popular. Blocking with 11 is a joseki move.

Simply connecting at 13 is Black’s strongest move. White 14 is the usual response.

Black attacks White’s base with 15.

White 16 is a good move that blocks Black’s path into the center, forcing him to live in the corner.

Even though Black 17 and 19 hit the key points, they are on the second line and hardly affect White’s position in the center.

Dia. 5

Instead of 8, it is also possible for White to make a low double approach with 1 in Dia. 5. The joseki to 5 is in vogue these days. Black wants to defend at ‘a’, but in modern go Black must emphasize speed to make up for the relatively large komi, so he will often play elsewhere. For example, he might build up a framework at the bottom with 6 and 8. White may now start a fight with ‘a’ or switch to ‘b’ for a more low-key game.

Dia. 6

Instead of immediately invading with 10, the hane of White 1 in Dia. 6 used to be common sense. However, all the common sense of the old days is now being questioned. If White were to play a hane at 1, Black would continue with the joseki to 6. White now has to extend to 7, likely followed by Black 8 and 10. Again, Black sets up a large-scale moyo.

Dia. 7

After White invades with 10, Black can block with 1 in Dia. 7, then switch elsewhere with 3 and 5. As we saw in Dia. 5, where White’s marked stone was at ‘a’, the focus of the game will soon shift to a white extension to ‘b’.

Dia. 8

After the white hane of 12 (marked stone) in the game, Black can also extend to 1 in Dia. 8, then cut with 3. White’s strongest resistance is 6 and 8. After Black 15, White can consider starting a capturing race by playing at ‘a’ or he can make life in the corner. Since the capturing race will not turn out well for him, White has to play a hane, followed by a connection with 16 and 18. Black naturally answers with 19 and 21, aiming to cut at ‘b’. White cleverly defends against this cut with 22 and 24. If Black now extends to 25, White cuts at 26, depriving Black’s stones at the top of eyes. Therefore, Black probably has to play 25 at ‘c’, allowing White to make the exchange of 25 for Black ‘d’. White will then play elsewhere, around ‘e’, for example.

Dia. 9

Instead of 8 in Dia. 8, White can’t block at 8 in Dia. 9, because Black sets up a ladder with 9 and 11. White’s marked stone falls just outside the path of this ladder.

Dia. 10

After Black 15 in Dia. 8, White can start a capturing race by blocking with 16 in Dia. 10. Black answers with 17 and 19 and White 20 starts the capturing race. After the moves to 33, the position becomes a seki. However, Black is able to cut with 27 and force with 29, creating two weak groups White has to take care of. This is an impossible situation for White, so playing 16 is unreasonable.

Dia. 11

Instead of 20 in Dia. 10, White might try playing a hane from the other side with 20 in Dia. 11. This move prevents the placement of 21 in Dia. 10. Black reduces White’s group to one eye with the moves to 25. He then uses his sente to clamp at 27, making miai of linking up underneath at ‘a’ and cutting at ‘b’. White’s position collapses.

Dia. 12

Instead of 14, White might consider extending to 1 in Dia. 12. If Black cuts at 2, White makes shape with 3 to 7, canceling out much of the influence of Black’s enclosure below. Note that White’s marked stone still has aji and is not yet completely dead.

Dia. 13

White 1 in Dia. 13 is a strong response to Black 15 in the game. It forces Black to defend tightly with 2. After White 3, jumping to Black 4 looks natural, but White still has good forcing moves with 5 and 7. He is also threatening to play ‘a’–Black ‘b’–White ‘c’, which puts Black’s group in a very precarious position. However —

Dia. 14

In response to White 1, Black might answer by attaching at 2, threatening to cut at ‘a’ next. If White defends with 3, Black jumps out to 4. White can take the corner with 5 to 9, but Black stakes out a large position at the top with 10.

Figure 3 (20–27)

White 20 has taken the initiative at the top, but it is probably better for him to play 20 around 21.

Before White gets the chance to complete his moyo, Black immediately invades it with 21. This is severe, making White 20 a dubious move.

Black 23 is also severe.

White strengthens his stones by jumping to 24, preparing to fight Black on equal terms at the top. However, it is a slow move that doesn’t make any territory.

Black 25 is a good peep, played to make White heavy.

With 27, Black takes the lead by surrounding a large chunk of territory.