Vital Endgame

The Shape of Things to Come

by Janice Kim

Buy the full book at gobooks.com

Are you struggling to handle complex situations and losing points because of it? Or have you hit a wall and feel like you can’t improve anymore? In the endgame, experienced players may find themselves with little room for improvement without putting in significant effort in the earlier stages of the game. On the other hand, the best endgame players may not need to improve much to win. That’s where Vital Endgame comes in — we offer a complete, self-paced course to guide you through endgame strategy and tactics. With our guide, you can confidently play in any endgame situation and come out on top.

Janice Kim, 3 Dan, and Jeong Soo-Hyun, 9 Dan, are the authors of the Learn to Play Go series of books. In Vital Endgame, readers in English can experience the unique approach of Korean baduk in 18 endgame techniques with a deep look at ko, capturing races, life and death, positional judgment, and the vital pathways of shape.

This EPUB is provided without Digital Rights Management (DRM), allowing you to read it on your EPUB reader of choice. We trust that you use this EPUB file for your personal use only. Buying the book at gobooks.com ensures that authors and publishers get paid, and makes it possible for us to convert more books to digital format.

This EPUB contains interactive go diagrams, which not all EPUB readers handle correctly. You can get a download link to a more compatible EPUB version containing only static diagrams at gobooks.com/support.html.

This EPUB reader does not support full scripting, so diagrams may not be interactive.

Copyright Page

Vital Endgame
The Shape of Things to Come

Author: Janice Kim 3 dan

Published by
Good Move Press
Endgame@Samarkand.net

Copyright © 2024 by Janice Kim

All rights reserved. This book or any part or parts hereof my not be reproduced in any form without written permission from Good Move Press.

ISBN of the printed version: 9798871821121

Converted for SmartGo Books by John Mifsud.

Contents

Vital Endgame

Copyright Page

Contents

Index

Preface and Acknowledgements

Go as Narrative

1 What is Endgame?

The chapters in gray are included only in the full book.

2 The Right to Play

Sente and Gote

Three Types of Endgame Moves

3 Absolute Score

4 9 Steps to Take

1. Prioritize Dual RTP

2. Add the Follow-Ups

3. Convert Moves to One-Way

4. Watch for Kryptonite

5. Eyes on the Edge

6. Watch for Voids

7. Step Back Against a Future Threat

8. Watch for Two Close Borders

9. Watch Out for Flooding

5 Finding Endgame

1. Second-Line Captures

2. Dual RTP Diagonals

3. Monkey Jumps

4. Second-Line Turns

5. Kite Flying

6. Second-Line Descent

7. Clamps

8. The Mouse

6 18 Techniques to Know

1. Jumpcut the Knight Move

2. Shore to Ship

3. Diagonal Descent

4. Pear Attachment

5. Timing the Border

6. RTP Monkey Jump

7. Double Tiger

8. Diagonal Push

9. Claimjumping

10. Edansu

11. Lose the Capturing Race

12. Extend the Capturing Race

13. Leveraged Connection

14. Order Matters

15. The Bow

16. Pulling the Bow

17. The Staircase

18. Orion

7 Strategic Counting and Judgment

1. How to Calculate Territory Size

2. How to Find the Absolute Score

3. Positional Judgment

8 Vital Pathways

1. The Way to Cross

2. The Way to Cut Off the Tail

3. The Way Under the Stones

4. Pear-Shaped Pathway

5. Left-Right Pathway

6. The First Line Pathway

7. The Sandstone Pathway

8. The Ko Pathway

9. The Way to Tighten Liberties

10. Enclosed Invasions

Buy This Book

About SmartGo Books

Index

25 Life & Death and Endgame Positions

Cathedral

Pear Life

Fast Turtle

Low Orion

Peacock

Sandwich

Bent Four in the Corner

Claimjump

Make a Turtle Foundation

Count Zero

Eternal Ko

The Taxicab

Edansu

Cyclops

Turtleback

Epsilon (also here)

Delta

Zeta

Slow Turtle

4321

The Staircase

The Universe

Shapes in the Universe

Orion (also here)

Mouse (also here)

Staircase

Bow

Pulling the Bow

Galaxy (also here)

Moves in the Universe

Hitting the Head of Two (also here)

Eyestealing (also here)

Spoiling the Bamboo

Throw-in

Dual Life (also here, here, and here)

Divine Move

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book is based on my teacher Jeong Soo-Hyun 9 dan’s Korean books and classical Go texts. For that reason, most of the starting points in this book are famous examples or ones my teacher used. However, errors or omissions are mine as I adapted them to develop the context with which English readers may be unfamiliar. Experience with teaching students as an English speaker made me think that a Korean book on endgame was needed but could not be translated comprehensibly.

With its vital pathways, underwater territories, and bill of rights, it might need to be clarified this is the same endgame of finishing up borders and counting points. I believe this is much closer to the original view of the ‘endgame’ of Go or wei-ch’i or baduk as found in ancient assemblies of knowledge.

Players of any level will find moments of discovery of the possibilities in the endgame. Jump in and take away as time and interest allow.

I want to express my gratitude to the Korea Baduk Association and all its members and former students, for their tireless effort and kindness in teaching and sharing the game. I want to acknowledge them in more and better ways. In recent years, I have appreciated the Go community on Facebook, a particularly vibrant and supportive group. Knowing they are there, I have taken great cheer.

Dr. Paul Howard made this book possible through his thoughts, ideas, efforts, and inspiration. I am indebted to my parents Dr. KC Kim and Joan Kim, and my sister Dr. Ellen Kim, as well as to ‘Shore to Ship’ friends Brian D’Amato, David Mechner, Glenn Peters, Michael Kris, Mark Fraser, Dellard Adkins, and Bill Reynolds.

Janice Kim
March 1, 2024

For Malachi Aidan Joon and Ashira Liyah Young

Go as Narrative

A game of Go is like a story with three acts. There’s an advantage to thinking of it this way: a game is long, and the objective—making territory—is a multi-stage process.

The endgame is vital in how the story ends. The storyteller can summarize the story in three words describing each stage’s strategy. For example, imagine you’re diamond mining in Canada.

When word gets out that someone has located diamonds, the race is on to see who can get the most. The rule is that anyone who marks out an area with stakes and files the claim at the local post office has the mining rights to the land. The strategic objective in this opening stage is SPEED.

Speed means taking the initiative, maximizing yields, shortening distances, and putting your stakes in the frozen, empty landscape according to the best maps and models. You look up because you hear the sound of a plane overhead. Someone’s up there with the plane door open, throwing stakes out the window.

It’s anyone’s game to win after the stakes hit the ground. It’s time to move personnel and equipment and start mining. The strategy in this middle stage depends on ACCURACY. Did you claim enough to stay even for the long haul?

It’s a long way to the finish line.

Finally, the mining operations are well underway, and the competition is close. Who is winning? Many players have just left skeleton teams to finish after the massive battles to get things up and running. Now the game becomes one of PRECISION.

Surveyors will check all the details in each local area. They’ll draw final property lines before players take anything to the bank. You know something vital about this stage. It’s not what they think it is. Whoever has the claim at the bank, not at the post office, wins the game.

With this narrative, the whole venture could take off. These diamond mines are limitless. In Go, there is no chance beyond what you bring to it. That is called a ‘perfect information’ game or telling a winning story.

1 — What is Endgame?

Endgame in Go is a critical concept for strategic gameplay. In the game’s beginning, the corners are the most important spots on the board. There are four corners, and both players have the opportunity to make their initial move in two of them.

Black makes the first move and gets to choose which corner to take first. White will then make the final corner move, creating a balanced position. After just four moves, we can assess the game’s equality and experiment with the move order to reach the same final position. This analysis method helps determine the best possible outcome, ensuring that each move is essential. This underscores the importance of playing strategically, maintaining flexibility while limiting the opponent’s options, even without knowing the specific moves in advance.

Dia. 1

＞＜ ▶︎

When playing strategically, it’s important to consider countable points and how to achieve them. If your goal is speed in the opening stage, it’s crucial to claim potential territory that can be turned into countable points with as few moves as possible. Look ahead and choose a move with follow-ups that surround an area you can count as territory. For example, Black can make a move in the first corner, looking three moves ahead (Black 1, Black 3, and Black 5) to gain a point lead.

A round consists of the three or four urgent moves on the board. The first four moves are Round 1, and if Black has sente (the choice of which corner to take), White must respond by playing in another corner to match Black’s ability to surround territory.

Dia. 2

＞＜ ▶︎

Even if Black plays the first move in the center, Black can still get two corners. However, if White encloses a corner first, White will be able to take the point lead. Changing the order of the moves, not their location, will limit White’s options and prevent White from surrounding a corner on Move 4 the same way Black does on Move 5.

In the Game of the Century, playing on the center point was so new that the public debated whether Go Seigen was disrespectful to Honinbo Shusai. They may not have known that Go Seigen had just turned 19 that summer of 1933, and six years prior, he had played his first match, starting on the center starpoint against Kitani Minoru. That was after inquiring if he was allowed to play there.

What changed from Go Seigen’s beginnings as a professional Go player to becoming a challenger to what would be the equivalent of the undisputed world champion? He played the starpoint on Move 5, not Move 1.

Dia. 3

＞＜ ▶︎

Black can take a third corner if White takes the point lead with 4. One may assess a 3–3 corner at 9 points; Black has an 18–11 lead after 5 moves. White would next look to play ‘A’. In Diagram 2, White will take a 20–9 lead in countable points.

Moves 1–14

＞＜ ▶︎

The impossible four stone 81-point box.

Playing in the diagonal corners first limits White’s options. The concern when playing in the center is the point loss, assuming having more countable points at any time is better. In the endgame, one chooses specific tactics, for example, the turn rather than the clamp on the first line, to avoid spending another move. It is always more points globally to spend additional moves to claim more in the opening, not to maximize or reduce a claim.

As an opening strategy, Black uses specific tactics to have fewer points but more moves elsewhere. Choosing one 3–3 and one starpoint seems contradictory if one sees the starpoint as influence, not potential territory. Is it possible to accelerate past the middle game with more potential than actual points? If declaring victory on Move 5 leaves too much of an undetermined area, is timing a victory later possible?

Moves 15–21

＞＜ ▶︎

Fewer moves = acceleration

White 16 responds conservatively to Black 15, the dog’s neck configuration. It’s a good exchange for Black to block White from jumping up before the kick at 17, and White has limited his points in the southeast for a second approach from the northwest at 20. There is limited potential in the narrow channel between 14 and 20, while the northern border is open. Black is hinting at a victory with 21.

How does Honinbo Shusai deal with Black’s plan, which relies on occupying the perfect position? Go Seigen played two games with him before taking Black and winning both. However, this is a unique match. A separate competition determined the top challenger. The Honinbo represented himself. There was no constraint on the two top players to bring their best game. It was not evident by their moves which one expected to win or the path to victory. Honinbo Shusai took territory in a way that looked to counteract Black’s increased potential while taking advantage of Black’s lack of territory. Is Black’s upper right 11 points? It looks like 9.

Moves 22–25

＞＜ ▶︎

Position vs. timing, or both?

Black starts the territory claim with some unusual play. If one found Black 21 too slow, perhaps one did not consider redemption with bad shape if there is enough in the center to compare against giving White a 3–1 initial corner advantage.

Black plays another dog neck at 23, inviting White to take the third corner. White takes advantage of the earlier bad-shape kick by spoiling the resulting tiger mouth at 24. Black responds with another spoiled tiger at 25, inviting White to walk under the barricade Black put up as expediency. The advantage of the first move is no longer visible. On the other hand, it is not visible on Move 4 either—will there be a move coming up where Black pulls ahead?

Dia. 4

＞＜ ▶︎

If Black had made points in the corner with a galaxy shape instead of 25, Black would have ended with sente when White pushes up and crosses underneath. Black could next play in the northeast, where White omitted a move from an earlier round. Black is better off on countable points with two corners but has less potential in the center.

Before Black plays in the northeast, if Black first tries to pull further ahead by playing 1, White does not want to follow by making the mouse shape at △ and securing the southeast corner. White plays in the northeast at 2, Black must follow through, and in the sequence A—D, White takes the lead.

The takeaway? Sente is an offer to split what is left and keep sente—Black 1 prevents White from making more. It can be a small conditional mistake if White sees it as an offer to keep what he has. Responding is a more significant mistake. The mistake would be the same for both—a reduction or block. At the same time, a more urgent move from an earlier round of play that forms the basis for points remains.

Move 79

＞＜ ▶︎

What?!?

Black has now taken visible advantage of having the first move by consistently defending a single large potential territory. How does one maximize certainty? We have always assumed countable points, as early as possible, are better than potential points. Is Black counting a solid point lead with 79?

Dia. 5—everything but 79

＞＜ ▶︎

Can Black bypass a fight?

A white stone at 79 would be difficult to contain in a game plan of converting center potential into countable points. If White were reducing this area, the magnitude of any play on the border would be so high that Black would have no choice but to answer it defensively. Black can’t be sure that White would respond in a way that takes points after White plays 20, so Black could let White solidify both of White’s borders in the south and east and then close the west border in anticipation of White 20.

These stones will help in the upcoming center battle, but needing to convert so much potential into countable points is a significant concern. Like Shusaku’s Diagonal, Go Seigen’s Double Diagonal could be better point-wise. Does it matter? A lead is a lead.

Isn’t Black 79 the right idea to stick to the plan? Why play in the south first? White can’t do anything there because he must invade the west, and he will take a turn to do it. Black will bank 40 points in the center, with more points in the east and an invasion in the north rather than giving them away for help in a fight Black doesn’t want. In the meantime, best practices will keep the person behind in the running, looking for the forks in the road no one anticipated.

A hidden threat (95)

＞＜ ▶︎

Why doesn’t Black play at A?

The specific reason Black plays here makes one wonder if perhaps Black should have pushed White low in the south first. What kept Black from doing anything before 79 would be a concern about staking it all on the center—White would not take a point loss to prevent it. Would White take a point loss to allow it? Why did Black take a loss here?

The one who is behind offers continuous trades, and the one who is ahead declines them. Perhaps Black is judging correctly that he has enough to win.

Dia. 6. An invisible choice

＞＜ ▶︎

An invisible choice

After Black plays the natural-looking tiger mouth, he can exchange A for B and C for D. That would be the best local result, but Black steps back from a hidden threat: White has peeps at 1 and 5. Black can’t answer 5 at 6.

White doesn’t need to play 5 and take an unnecessary loss before Black makes the choice where to play 95. It’s an invisible stone that is always White’s option and limits Black’s options. Keeping it unplayed is not a matter of stealth. White 5 is more of a loss than Black 95 would be.

Perhaps Black was right that finishing the south is unnecessary before 79. The tiger mouth is still an option, because answering White 5 at the triangle is an option Black did not choose to take. If one sets up each move as between two good choices, there’s no mistake. Black has committed to center points; the plan doesn’t require Black to maximize value with any particular move.

Dia. 7. A or B?

How to handle the invasion—A or B?

As predicted, Black got the invasion in the north. Should White try to capture this stone? One may wonder—isn’t a capture the best result? When stones are one point away from each other on the side, the choice is often the same: the spoiled tiger mouth at A, or blocking the side or the top? How does one choose?

Wouldn’t it be amazing to read it and know the answer? That is, to have no choice, doesn’t the invader need to escape or live? Does one invade in the same spirit as a speculative attack by White? In the meantime, how do we know the game is within a point or two? Is this where one gives it up small? No. It’s close. Both players should go big or go home.

Dia. 8. I’ll take C.

Why attack? I’ll take C.

When it comes to capturing Black, the answer is yes, you can, but it’s important to be careful. Trying to barely capture from the initial position won’t result in a good outcome for Black. It’s not a great idea to make a speculative attack when it comes to balancing territory.

If you’re considering enclosing a side invasion using the spoiled tiger with the intent to capture, know what to expect. Before making a move, it’s necessary to see the capturing sequence to the same standard as a life-and-death problem—being ready to stake the game on being not only right, but converting all one’s sente to points now is enough advantage—the board is not big enough to balance. It might seem like avoiding difficulty by not reading about it, but there’s nothing about this position that suggests Black’s move is unreasonable or that White can profitably capture. Black can take charge of finishing White’s new territory and use the invader like a last-minute houseguest White must awkwardly accommodate after inviting them to stay.

If you imagine your opponent owes a move or two to secure the territory basis, you have a couple of options. You can either play a sente move-and-response exchange and force them to create a secure enclave, or you can play moves that affect the score by reducing territory while finishing borders. They can use their sente to pay a move owed or carry it forward—it’s their choice.

A or B? (144)

＞＜ ▶︎

A or B—a simple question?

Is it possible this is the game winning or losing decision?

It is challenging to judge. White’s peep is a sente move that expands territory prevents Black from playing here—easy to choose. It is the best response that isn’t clear. White didn’t play 144 to make points or give Black a tough choice. It just is—ordinarily, one would play the second line turn at B, making points instead of connecting automatically. The connection doesn’t have much point value, so from that viewpoint B is correct. Is there a thickness value?

Is it better to connect one’s group solidly or make more points in general? Black isn’t worried about the group in the center being captured. The question is whether one could exploit it to good effect. Not directly. Black’s center territory very close by has a slightly wide gap. If White cuts at A, Black will need another move to ensure life in the corner.

Moves 1–16—If A

＞＜ ▶︎

If A: The inflection point?

The correct order isn’t a given, but Black wants to play 6, and endgame moves like 8 and 10 that would make it unnecessary to play 12. Black is likely to never reach the inflection point—crossing the line between winning and losing. One can’t judge the best reply in terms of points, but in White having the advantage of another move in the center.

A or B? (156–159)

＞＜ ▶︎

More spoiled tigers

The connection would favor Black—an extra move in the center is what White needs. There is no komi.

White found remarkable ways to take advantage of cutting off Black’s stones in sente to disrupt Black’s center. It is far from over, considering there is no direct attack.

Black defends against the threat presented by 156 as actively as possible by spoiling the tiger mouth at 157. If Black blocks the center before White plays 158, Black may not answer at 159, making any move in the center a potential loss for White. Next, White can play A or B.

The Controversy (160)

＞＜ ▶︎

The Controversy—is not A or B.

One can call this The Game of the Century, heralding the rise of alternate moves to the 3–4 point in the New Opening. Likewise, one could call White 160 The Controversy of the Century. It centered around a newspaper story that the Honinbo did not think of this move; rather, it was his student. It may seem plausible, given the amount of time—in some cases, games went on for months—that both players had to get outside help.

The argument beyond having opportunity was weak: one does not allow a split knight—playing such an ugly move is impossible. Believing that some moves are correct and some are wrong, one would need help to find it; in keeping with the idea, there are no terrible moves, only a lack of analysis. Perhaps Shusai’s student was analyzing it. What about the moves that came before 160?

White had already played the forcing exchange and the spoiled tiger—it was either ugly or unnecessary to play both unless one intended to play 160 from the beginning by paving the way for a move that could go in either direction, whichever way Black blocked. The continuous emphasis on offering two good options with different merits cannot be a coincidence.

A or B? (161)

＞＜ ▶︎

Does Black cut at A, or B?

With two simple moves to select for move 160, why pick move C unless it is one’s intention all along? Is there a reason why Black also chose another option, given A or B, matching Shusai’s split knight? It may give a unique insight into the nature of the endgame as strategic rather than tactical—four times, Go Seigen made the same strategic choice that was a loss of points. He was right each time it kept him in the lead. There may not be a reason to deviate from the predicted best play, but there is no reason to play it the one time it mattered.

Based on that choice, we don’t get a good reason for losing the game. Instead, we get more insights that people can use in replicable ways instead of hinge factors, where we can attribute failure to a lack of a nail. For White, sente is a minimalist offer—even responding by offering a choice of responses. At 144, 160, and 178, White offered Black a choice of how to respond. The first response was the game-loser, the second an impossible choice, and the third a game-winner.

A or B? (162)

＞＜ ▶︎

I’ll take the triangle option.

The initial question was whether the connection had more value than the turn in the northwest corner. It depended on whether White could exploit Black’s group to reduce the center. White 162 suggests Black consider A or B, and Black chooses a third option.

A timing strategy came head-on with positional strategy, and it was White’s invisible gain of a move later that was the missing value of connecting when Black chose to convert sente to points with the game-losing 145. But now White must convert sente into points also.

Round 1 (177)

＞＜ ▶︎

A winning round of play?

There are usually three or four moves in an endgame round, similar to the corners in the opening. The difference is one will get two of them in the opening, and the idea is to get all of them in the endgame. Where are they?

Dia. 9. A four-move round

＞＜ ▶︎

The results of Round 1

What do you think of the plan below? Would you switch the order?

When trying to find a winning move, it’s important to really understand a move that could lead to losing the game. because even though humans don’t have the same computational abilities as AI, they can still play with a level of precision that’s comparable. When a master player consistently demonstrates their skills, it shows how they can achieve brilliance. For example, if White makes the last four crucial moves—White 1, 3, 5, and 7—yet still loses, it highlights how simply changing the order of these moves could lead to victory.

A or B? (178)

＞＜ ▶︎

When one needs A and B.

Perhaps Black saw a win from here and did not consider the possibility of Move 178. This caliber of move requires precision in positional judgment. White’s greatest source of strength may outshine Black’s amazing skill.

Or perhaps Go Seigen’s game-losing move was overestimating the value of countable points here or not seeing the possibility White could switch the order. Confronted by losing with all the endgame points in sente, White played a sente move where Black needed to respond in two different places.

If White pushes in at A, White can catch Black’s five stones using the Orion technique. If White pulls out the two stones at B, Black can’t catch them because they can connect to 178.

Move 179

＞＜ ▶︎

When to trade

Given a choice between two moves, Black found a third path.

Playing the correct order in the endgame means knowing the desired goal in terms of points and where they will be. One trades one or two points for sente and plays first in every area. One never rushes sente and plays reverse sente last, all based on absolute score-based points. Sente will be a choice; one gives the option to one’s opponent if there is no winning path forward.

Dia. 10. Another round

What order to play A-D?

It’s essential to have a clear game plan with a specific goal to succeed. When you understand the necessary timing of each move and play strategically, you have a better chance of winning. Keeping the plan simple with just a few key moves can help you stay focused and calm about what might seem like urgent or big moves at the time. Please stick to your plan and don’t deviate from it.

In the specific game situation from moves 190 to 202, it’s essential to follow through with the moves that Black didn’t respond to and take the points at A. One must consider which move is most urgent at that moment in terms of what is left for one’s opponent to play, and understand why the players chose their moves in that particular order. White won’t have a chance to play 190 before Black does, if playing 192 first.

Moves 190–202

＞＜ ▶︎

White cannot block at C but must follow through with what Black could not respond to and take the points at A. Of the other two moves, D is sente, B is not. If White plays A, Black can play at B first and then play at D. Through this lens, it is clear why the players chose their moves in this precise order.

White ended by taking gote and connecting underneath at 202.

Moves 203–217

＞＜ ▶︎

Black plays all the one-way sente before coming back to play 215. Black’s moves in the southwest are meant to finish this area without losing sente; Black plays them and the first line turn at 205 before playing 215.

Let’s turn the endgame sequences into easy-to-follow guidelines. Understanding the reasons behind mysterious decisions can simplify choices. The players can already picture the final borders and tally the total score.

White can block the northwest, but saw it was not large enough. Instead, White made a strategic move in the center that offered Black a choice. Both players successfully found third options. Although prioritizing the center over the edges is unusual in the endgame, Black’s strategy in this game was to secure center territory. Black’s plan was disrupted by White’s minimalism and timing that appeared as hidden threats. White’s moves were influenced by the need to balance the territory and offer continuous trades. Understanding essential shapes and techniques were vital to understanding timing so one’s turn isn’t like finding a ko threat when it’s unlinked from countable points.

White gained points in the center, but the success of the plan crucially depended on understanding the fundamentals of endgame:

Considering the order of play of a round;

Switching the order and making comparisons;

Sticking to the plan, or flexibility in trading when there is no clear victory;

Understanding the reasons for following through or not blocking endgame moves.

White was careful not to lose the one-way sente at D but not play it too early; to plan on never blocking the northwest territory but only connecting the stones there and being certain to follow through at A when Black cannot respond.

Black’s tactical skill and mastery of strategy meant White could not win on points, so White won by gaining moves. Maintaining balanced territory was essential. Hindsight showed that one move was more valuable than the other regardless of point size, reduction was worth more than blocking or even border breaches because of sente value, and minimalism is key to leaving options open, so skill in timing can overcome a disadvantage.

Moves 218–235

＞＜ ▶︎

Honinbo Shusai loses points in the endgame?

It’s understandable to think that one couldn’t play as well as the best players in the world. Still, the endgame is more engaging and doable than initially thought.

White can either block or pull back with 194. The value in points is secondary to the importance of who will play first and last. White needs to be cautious not to initiate or accept any necessary trades to stay balanced. This could mean a victory by fewer points, with less chance of any position having an unavoidable advantage—having one move left with Black’s turn to play for example. Meanwhile, Black shows the best way to break free from White’s planned moves and victory. Ask—block or pull back? Either way, Black reduces this area to a remarkable extent using classic endgame technique.

If White blocks, making more points there, Black 215 becomes sente. White could ignore it and play the ‘reverse sente’ move at 196, one of the four moves of the earlier round. If White was behind, White might have been willing to make a trade to gain in the west and lose in the east.

By choosing to pull back, White eliminates Black’s opportunity to propose a trade. It is not taking a loss to avoid complications; taking sente will cost points because it is fewer moves.The move advantage comes after Black 215.

White 216 has shades of Black’s earlier game-losing choice of making points rather than connecting. It is almost invisible how it could be a point loss. The difference is that White is sticking to the winning plan using known final borders.

Pulling back at 194 and reading ahead to 216 may seem like a stunning calculation, but can also be simple—if White has visualized borders and knows it’s a win, White knows this cannot be Black’s one-way sente, and does not care that it is possibly double sente.

Military blunders are also caused by changing the plan at the last moment without a reason to do so—winning by more is not a reason. White may have won by less.

Honinbo Shusai may have yet to make an effort to find the best sequence of moves after seeing that he should take the center moves A and D and give away B and C without a second thought.

One may recall this is the same Honinbo Shusai, the Master of Go, in the novel of the same name. When he ‘miscounts’ at the end of his final game, author Kawabata speculates the reason for the ‘mistake’.

Moves 236–252

＞＜ ▶︎

Kawabata sees it unusual for the Master of Go to make a mistake regarding the score. Perhaps the Master of Go never recounted or recalculated any game once he knew who would win.

Remember the importance of carefully planning your moves in the endgame. Consider the timeline in chunks of three or four urgent moves with a specific overall goal. Play precisely and avoid unnecessary moves to maintain or gain the lead.

Front-loading your efforts may take more time and energy initially, both in a single game and gaining Go strength. Still, it ultimately simplifies and streamlines the endgame by eliminating the need to re-evaluate every step of the way.

While estimating territories is helpful, be cautious about prioritizing any single move by analysis, doubling local move sizes, or assuming a static and balanced position overall, as it can lead to instant game losses. Having one alternative, A or B, means 80% of problems encountered when there is more than one move left you can address in advance by reading three moves ahead globally, not tactically, in the endgame—your move, your opponent’s move, your move.

Trust your insights and intuition, and remember that preventing problems is as important as solving them. Lastly, in the micro endgame stage, look at all the borders once to note what and where the basic moves are to minimize mistakes without time pressure.

More knowledgeable players can make more mistakes here than the less experienced because it is the only time one can realistically consider local move sizes and play them in order.That one might consider doing it, yet other players achieve precision much earlier suggests a belief that there is some calculation involved that others don’t see as math but is nevertheless complex and time-consuming, for only modest gains in points. It highlights Error #1 of Endgame: assuming a fixed numerical value to a move.

Attempts to calculate it result in continuing to add value to playing first, both in playing defensive moves in advance of the initiative, being unclear whether to respond, and looking for initial plays when the end is in sight—that is, reverse sente, responding to one-way sente, and when to play sente. If visualizing the final border at the end with no attempt to put a numerical value on any move, one sees what the picture was all along in absolute value—calculating moves and sequences one can count and imagine.

In attempting to explain how it works, the takeaway may be that it is too complicated. Anything that seems so in the endgame those who would like to see it worked out in detail can look at. Still, it’s optional and unnecessary to do to play optimally. For example, rather than wondering if you should block a one-way sente follow-up if it’s your turn, the short answer is no. Doesn’t it depend in each case on how big it is relative to other moves? Well, you’d need the context of it being more absolute points than the next two moves combined considering the order of moves.

One can see both how someone can worry about that case, and need to see where the points went when one plays reverse sente or wins a ko and loses points—it is not that one misunderstands in general, but in a game, how it applies when it appears to be the opposite can be the anchor one never sees.

Don’t allow yourself to be bogged down by the necessities of logical proof, or miss easy precision not questioning what one knows. It’s one thing to know it’s not important to win by more—another to not realize an attempt to do that and it costs the game.

When the missing end of the narrative comes into view, can you predict where the territory will be? Looking at the final picture, do you see how the decision points affected the outcome?

What’s on beyond the endgame?

Black’s Opening in 3D—max potential

As a Go teacher, I know the interest most people will have in a starpoint age is how to invade. First things first: we need an endgame. It’s incredible to see where the territory ended up on a 3D board when we first saw the starpoint in a full battle array.

Who would guess that not attacking Black’s invasion of the north ended up with that much territory for White—with one lone black stone in the middle? It would mean reducing Black’s center territory by half? And it would have been enough for Black if White had not been in control of game time, where the most valuable moves somehow occur on his turn, and difficult choices to lose points appear for Black like clockwork?

White’s side looks bigger than Black’s center

Did Honinbo Shusai consider the choice of one-point over knight move enclosure of the northwest with that in mind, not from a local tactics/point perspective? Too soon to dismiss the 3–4? In my Go narrative, it will be Rise of the Titans soon, not a game where even AI knows the answer.